

JULIA CHRISTIANE GABRIELA NETTER

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AOS: Political philosophy. — **AOC:** History of political thought, ethics, PPE.

EDUCATION AND QUALIFICATIONS

- Doctor of Philosophy in Politics** 2013–2018
DPhil thesis title: *“Why Be Reasonable? Political Liberalism, Moral Pluralism, and Deep Disagreement”*.
Advised by Dr Gideon Elford; examined by Prof. Cécile Laborde and Dr Jeremy Williams.
Department of Politics and International Relations & Christ Church, University of Oxford, UK
- Master of Philosophy in Politics (Political Theory)** 2011–2013
MPhil thesis (distinction): *“Reasonably coercing the unreasonable? Investigating the challenge of unreasonable views to liberal political theory”*, supervised by Dr Rebecca Reilly-Cooper.
Department of Politics and International Relations & New College, University of Oxford, UK
- Bachelor of Arts in Political Science** 2008–2011
Final grade: 1.2 (distinction)
Bachelor dissertation: *“The Sovereign State in Demise? The Evolution of Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization”*.
Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg, Germany
- Abitur** (German higher education entrance qualification) 2005–2008
Final grade: 1.1 – Examined subjects: History, French, Biology, German.
Willibald Gluck-Gymnasium, Neumarkt i.d.OPf., Germany

WORK UNDER REVIEW

“Political liberalism, deep moral disagreement, and higher-order commitments to cooperation”

WORKS IN PROGRESS

- “Justifying reasonableness to unreasonable citizens”
“Tensions within the internal conception of political liberalism”
“What’s wrong with nonpublic reasons? The private lives of foundational beliefs”

CONFERENCE AND WORKSHOP PAPERS

- Constructing public reason: travels in the background culture**
Theories of Public Reason panel at the MANCEPT Workshops in Political Theory, Manchester, UK, September 2018.
- What’s wrong with nonpublic reasons?**
Nuffield Political Theory Workshop, Oxford, UK, October 2016.
- What’s wrong with advocacy from nonpublic reasons under circumstances of incompleteness?**
Theories of Public Reason panel at the MANCEPT Workshops in Political Theory, Manchester, UK, September 2016.
- Incompleteness and fundamental moral disagreement – justifying strategies to counter indeterminacy in public justification.**
Theories of Public Reason panel at the MANCEPT Workshops in Political Theory, Manchester, UK, September 2015.
- Investigating the challenge of unreasonable dissent to liberal political theory.**
Warwick Graduate Conference in Political and Legal Theory, Warwick, UK, February 2013.

TEACHING

Tutor for Theory of Politics course , New College, Oxford Small-group teaching of undergraduate students; set and marked weekly essays.	2015–2017
Revision tutor for Philosophy, Politics, and Economics (PPE) students, New College, Oxford Planned and executed revision classes for exam preparation.	2017
Grader for College Collections (Theory of Politics prelims and finals), New College, Oxford Marked student essays on history of political thought and contemporary political theory.	2017

PROFESSIONAL TRAINING

Invited participant at the weekly Nuffield Political Theory Workshop <i>Nuffield College, University of Oxford</i>	2015–2017
Completed Undergraduate Teaching Training for Graduate Students <i>University of Oxford</i>	October 2013

ACADEMIC SERVICE

Organized the Theories of Public Reason panel at the MANCEPT Workshops in Political Theory	September 2018
Co-organized the Theories of Public Reason panel at the MANCEPT Workshops in Political Theory (<i>with Areti Theofilopoulou</i>)	September 2017

FELLOWSHIPS AND AWARDS

Department of Politics and International Relations–Christ Church Studentship , fully funding DPhil research at the University of Oxford.	2013–2015
Scholarship by the German National Academic Foundation for pursuing a degree abroad ("Auslandsförderung"), part-funding MPhil degree at the University of Oxford.	2011–2013
Awarded the departmental prize for academic distinction in Political Science at Otto-Friedrich-Universität Bamberg.	September 2011
Admitted to membership of the German National Academic Foundation (Studienstiftung des deutschen Volkes).	late 2008
Awarded the prize for the highest final grade of the county in the Abitur degree, as well as prizes for highest grades in Abitur examinations in History and French.	June 2008

RELATED PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Library Clerk , <i>Christ Church College Library</i> Oxford, UK	February 2016–June 2017
Legislative Intern with MEP Albert Defß , <i>European Parliament</i> Brussels, Belgium	April–July 2011
Student Research Assistant , <i>Political Theory Group at the Otto-Friedrich-Universität</i> Bamberg, Germany	2009–2011

SELECTED GRADUATE COURSEWORK

Theory of Politics
Ethics
Epistemology
Philosophy of Social Science
Political Theories from Machiavelli to Burke
Text and Interpretation (methods in political theory and philosophy)
International Normative Theory

LANGUAGES

English: fluent — **German:** native speaker — **French:** advanced
Latin: rudimentary — **Modern Hebrew:** rudimentary

REFERENCES

References are available upon request.

DISSERTATION ABSTRACT

Political liberalism contains a commitment to public justification. The exercise of coercion on the basis of political principles is only thought to be proper if these principles are acceptable to each and every reasonable person. The fact that political liberalism restricts the constituency of public justification, *i.e.*, the constituency of those who are owed justifications, to reasonable people is significant. I argue that, as it stands, this restriction is problematic.

Specifically, political liberalism's core commitment to respect for persons as ends in themselves is in conflict with its refusal to justify their exclusion to some individuals who will be coerced. Furthermore, attempts to dispense with the need to provide justifications to the unreasonable seem to resolve that tension, but only at the cost of introducing a second defect: an impoverished and ultimately illiberal conception of the person which refuses to regard individual persons as morally autonomous.

I conclude that political liberalism must justify the very criterion of individuals' exclusion from the constituency of public justification – reasonableness – to those who fail to live up to that standard. The justifications it offers must not lose sight of the liberal commitment to respecting individuals' moral autonomy. To that end, I argue, such justifications must be rooted in the set of reasons and beliefs which individuals can be said to be committed to.

Two different kinds of unreasonableness warrant different kinds of justifications: there are those who are fundamentally unreasonable because they reject the core liberal commitment to persons as free and equal, while others merely fail to be fully reasonable when encountering deep moral disagreement in political debates, falling short of the requirement to engage with others in public reason on the basis of shared values. With respect to the former, it can be argued that a commitment to regarding their fellow citizens as free and equal is implicit in their attitude and conduct towards them. The latter individuals can be offered justifications for restraint which are rooted in the character of the very moral convictions they are tempted to draw on in public reason.

Full dissertation available at <http://www.julianetter.de/pub/dphil-final.pdf>.